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The best qubit one-way quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol can tolerate up to 14.1% in the
error rate. It has been shown how this rate can be increased by using larger quantum systems. The
polarization state of a biphoton can encode a three level quantum system - a qutrit. The realization
of a QKD system with biphotons encounters several problems in generating, manipulating and
detecting such photon states. We define those limitations and find within them a few protocols
that perform almost as well as the ideal qutrit protocol. One advantage is that these protocols can
be implemented with minor modifications into existing single photon systems. The security of one
protocol is proved for the most general coherent attacks and the largest acceptable error rate for
this protocol is found to be around 17.7%. This is the first time, to the best of our knowledge, that
the security of qutrit QKD protocols is rigorously analyzed against general attacks.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ex
In order to establish an unconditionally secure commu-
nication channel between two parties (traditionally called
Alice and Bob), they have to share a random sequence
of bits known only to them - a one time pad. Quantum
key distribution (QKD) is a scheme that exploits the de-
tails of quantum measurements for generating such a key.
In the most basic protocol (referred to as BB84 after its
inventors Bennett and Brassard[1]), Alice sends Bob a se-
ries of two level quantum systems, referred to as qubits.
The states are randomly chosen from two sets, each of
them contains two orthogonal states that represent the
logical zero and one. The two sets relate to each other in a
mutually-unbiased way, i.e. the probability of measuring
any particular state when given a state from a different
set is 1/2. Thus, if Alice chooses to send a state from the
first set, a measurement in the basis of the other, either
by Bob or by an eavesdropper (called Eve), will give no
information about Alice’s choice.
To create the required secret key, a few more steps
should be carried out through a classical channel, not
necessarily secured. First, Alice and Bob compare their
measurement bases and sift only those bits which were
measured in identical bases. From the remaining key,
they reveal a portion and compare the results in order
to estimate the noise parameter. This noise can result
either from a real physical noise in the channel as well
as from Eve’s measurements. Next, they perform two
transformations on the key, one to correct for errors and
the second, called privacy amplification, to reduce the
amount of mutual information between them and Eve.
A QKD protocol is characterized by a few parameters.
The ratio between the number of remaining bits after
completing this procedure to the number of bits before
it, is called the rate of the protocol. The merit function
that characterizes a specific protocol shows its rate as a
function of the disturbance, the error probability that the
channel and Eve have created. The higher the critical
disturbance, where the rate approaches zero, the more
useful is the protocol. In recent years, the lower bound
on the critical error rate of BB84 was improved several
times and the best known result is about 12.4%[2].
The BB84 protocol can be extended in many ways.
The first simple way is to add an extra base that is
mutually-unbiased with both others[3]. It can be easily
shown that only one mutually unbiased base (MUB) can
be added to the BB84 protocol. According to Ref. [2],
the current critical error rate of this three MUB protocol
is around 14.1%. Another approach is to use quantum
systems of higher dimensionality[4]. A three level sys-
tem can represent a quantum trit (qutrit) and a gen-
eral d-level system can represent a qudit. A possible
advantage is the larger number of MUB, up to d + 1
for a d-dimensional protocol[5]. Previously, generalized
protocols that use qutrits and higher dimensional quan-
tum systems have been suggested and their security was
studied[4, 6]. A potential advantage of improved rates
for such protocols was shown by examining various at-
tack schemes[7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. However, to the best of
our knowledge, the exact values of the critical error rates
for qutrit protocols subject to general attacks have never
been calculated prior to this work.
There are a few approaches for the realization of more
than two level quantum systems with light. One is by
discriminating between modes of different orbital angular
momentum[13, 14]. Another approach is to use several
spatial modes[15] or time bins[16]. A different approach
that has been studied extensively in recent years is the
qutrit representation of the polarization state of two in-
distinguishable photons - a biphoton[17, 18]. A general
biphoton state can be written as
|ψ2〉 = α0|2, 0〉+ α1|1, 1〉+ α2|0, 2〉 , (1)
where |nh, nv〉 is a Fock representation of nh (nv) hori-
zontally (vertically) polarized photons. The general state
ψ2 is represented by a complex vector α¯ = (α0, α1, α2)
with four degrees of freedom (3 complex numbers less a
2general phase and normalization). This scheme can be
also extended to higher dimensions by adding more pho-
tons, but in this Letter we focus on qutrits.
There are a few difficulties with generating arbi-
trary biphoton states[19] as well as when trying to
manipulate[20] and detect them. Optical parametric
down-conversion (PDC) is the obvious choice as a gener-
ating scheme, but there are only two types of processes
available; type I that creates states of the |2, 0〉 and |0, 2〉
forms, and type II that creates |1, 1〉 (both in a collinear
scheme). If a non-collinear scheme is used, type I can
create the |1, 1〉 type as well. In order to create a gen-
eral state as in Eq. 1, a sensitive interferometer that
includes both type I and II crystals is required. More-
over, as we will show later, it is impossible to transform
efficiently by means of linear optics a state created with
one PDC process into an arbitrary biphoton state. Fi-
nally, as transformations are limited, efficient detection is
only possible for the three basic vectors (the components
of Eq. 1, defined as the ’measurement basis’) and their
available transformations within those limits. Detection
of a general state is only possible with a beam-splitter
setup that detects a general state only 1 out of 4 tries.
In this Letter, we define the subset of biphoton states
which is easily generated, manipulated and detected. We
find biphoton QKD protocols within these limits that are
more secure and efficient than the best single photon pro-
tocol. Critical error rates are derived for various qutrit
protocols subject to general attacks, and compared to the
best possible qutrit protocol of 4 MUB[4].
First, we shall define the set of allowed transforma-
tions. When a biphoton is transmitted through a linear
optics setup, the polarization state of both of its pho-
tons experience the same single photon unitary transfor-
mation. The set of all possible unitary transformations
on a single photon polarization can be mapped onto the
Poincare´ sphere (or the Bloch sphere for a general qubit
realization), such that Uˆ(θ, ϕ) describes the operation
that transforms the state at the north pole to the coor-
dinates (θ, ϕ). Thus, if we position the state |1, 0〉 at the
north pole, a general operation will transform it into
Uˆ(θ, ϕ)|1, 0〉 = cos(θ/2)|1, 0〉+ sin(θ/2)eiϕ|0, 1〉 . (2)
We name the north pole state as the ’anchor’ state and
the set of Uˆ operators as the single photon operations. In
this single photon case it is trivial to show that whatever
anchor state is chosen, the Uˆ operators will always cover
the whole single photon polarization space. There are
a few simple rules to note. A trivial 2pi rotation along
any great circle will bring any state to itself, while a pi
rotation will transform any state to its orthogonal state.
Moreover, a rotation by only pi/2 along such a path al-
ways transforms between two mutually unbiased states.
We shall now find the set of states that can be
reached by applying Uˆ to the biphoton measurement ba-
sis. Choosing the states |2, 0〉 and |1, 1〉 as the anchors
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FIG. 1: A top projection from the north pole of an orthogonal
triplet basis on the |1, 1〉 dome. The empty circles are states
identical to their 180◦ opposites. Four states on this manifold
are mutually-unbiased to the triplet. These four states are
not orthogonal between themselves.
and applying the single photon operations, we get
Uˆ(θ, ϕ)(1, 0, 0) = (cos2(
θ
2
),
1√
2
sin(θ)eiϕ, sin2(
θ
2
)e2iϕ) ,(3)
Uˆ(θ, ϕ)(0, 1, 0) = (
1√
2
sin(θ), cos(θ)eiϕ,
−1√
2
sin(θ)e2iϕ) ,(4)
as the new α¯ vectors, respectively. By allowing only two
parameter operations from a finite set of anchor states,
we defined a two dimensional subset of the general bipho-
ton four dimensional space. As the |0, 2〉 state appears
at the south pole of the sphere defined by the |2, 0〉 an-
chor, there is a full overlap between spheres defined by
these two states. On the other hand, the |1, 1〉 state
does not appear on the |2, 0〉 sphere, thus defining a non-
overlapping sphere that can not be reached from the |2, 0〉
sphere by single photon operations.
It is possible to identify a few great circle rotation rules
for the two new spheres, that would be useful later when
we will look for possible QKD protocols in this subset.
First, the |2, 0〉 sphere inherited all of the properties from
the |1, 0〉 single photon sphere. A 2pi rotation returns to
the original state, a pi rotation transforms between two
orthogonal states and pi/2 between two states whose pro-
jection on each other is 1/2. In the case of the |1, 1〉
sphere, there is an interesting difference. The same rules
still apply, but for half the angles. A pi rotation returns
to the original state, a pi/2 rotation transforms between
two orthogonal states and pi/4 between two states whose
projection on each other is 1/
√
2. We can identify an or-
thogonal vector triplet on the |1, 1〉 sphere as three states
with pi/2 in between them. A simple example for such a
triplet is the |1, 1〉 state and two ’bunched’ states such as
|2, 0〉 + |2, 0〉 and |2, 0〉 − |2, 0〉[21]. Curiously, the state
which is exactly in the middle of any such triplet (at the
tetrahedral point, about 54.7◦ from all the triplet states)
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FIG. 2: a) The umbrella protocol: two mutually-unbiased
bases within the single-photon operation subspace. b) The
three rays protocol: three ray-type bases that are not per-
fectly mutually-unbiased.
is mutually unbiased with them (see Fig. 1). As opposite
points on the |1, 1〉 sphere are identical, it is enough to
consider only the upper half of the sphere (a dome).
The rotation rules convert the task of finding MUB to
a packaging problem. Is it possible to pack two triplet
bases together on the |1, 1〉 dome and preserve mutually-
unbiased relationship? By examining Fig. 1 it is easy to
see that it is impossible. On the other hand, we recog-
nize a second general type of an orthogonal basis. If we
position the dome concentrically inside the |2, 0〉 sphere
such that both of their north poles point in the same di-
rection, every ray that passes through the sphere center
will cut the subspace at three points, two on the sphere
and one on the dome. This ray triplet contains three or-
thogonal states. The simplest example is the vertical ray
that defines the measurement basis.
We define two possible protocols whose security will be
checked here. The first protocol has two perfectly MUB
and the second has three (or more) which are not. Apart
from the measurement basis which is included in both
protocols, the additional basis of the first protocol is
{
1√
3
(1, 1,−1), 1√
3
(1, τ,−τ2), 1√
3
(1, τ2,−τ)
}
, (5)
where τ = ei
2
3
pi. Notice how this basis is equivalent to the
second Fourier basis in Ref. [4], up to a minus sign at the
last position. We name this protocol after its umbrella
shape (see Fig. 2a). The two additional bases of the
second protocol are of the ray type:
{
1
2
(1,
√
2, 1),
1√
2
(1, 0,−1), 1
2
(1,−
√
2, 1)
}
, (6)
{
1
2
(1,
√
2i,−1), 1√
2
(1, 0, 1),
1
2
(−1,
√
2i, 1)
}
.
Although the three bases are only close to mutually-
unbiased, this protocol is appealing because of its symme-
try and similarity to the three bases protocol for qubits[3]
(see Fig. 2b). Additionally, we considered a protocol
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
 
I b
-I
e
E
FIG. 3: Intercept and resend analysis of a few QKD protocols.
Qubit protocols are in thin lines - dotted for BB84 and solid
for the 3 MUB extension. Thick lines are for qutrit protocols -
dotted, dashed, dot-dashed and solid for the umbrella, 3 rays,
7 rays and 4 MUB, respectively.
with 7 ray bases in order to check whether adding rays
improves the protocol. The 7 rays are the three of the
previous protocol, plus the four rays through the tetra-
hedral points (the directions are identical to the 7 solid
circles in Fig. 1)
The simplest eavesdropping attack scheme is the ’in-
tercept and resend’ approach. Showing that a protocol
is secure against this limited attack does not imply se-
curity against general attacks. It is only used here for
comparison between different protocols. We calculated
Bob and Eve mutual information with Alice with the
method of Ref. [4] and plotted the difference between
them as a function of the error rate for a few protocols
(see Fig. 3). There is a clear hierarchy between qubit
and qutrit protocols. The umbrella protocol is better
than any other using qubits, while the 3 rays protocol
is even better than the umbrella protocol even though it
does not include perfectly MUB. As expected, the best
performance belongs to the 4 MUB protocol, that marks
the upper limit for any qutrit protocol. Surprisingly, the
7 rays protocol performs very close to ideal. All critical
values are much higher than the real limits as this attack
scheme is far from ideal.
In order to prove the ultimate security that is required
from a QKD protocol, we use the general method intro-
duced in Ref. [2, 22]. The advantage of this method over
other previous security proofs is its easy extendability to
higher dimension while proving security against the most
general coherent attacks. The scheme results in a convex
nonlinear optimization problem for every error rate value.
Here, we only prove unconditional security for the 4 MUB
and the umbrella protocols as they correspond to simpler
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FIG. 4: Key generation rate analysis for a general coherent
attack. Solid (dashed) lines are for calculation with (without)
noise optimization. Presented results are for 3 qubit and 2 and
4 qutrit MUB (3x2, 2x3 and 4x3 respectively).
sets of constraints than the ray protocols. Nevertheless,
it is only reasonable to assume that as the performance of
the ray type protocols according to intercept and resend
analysis is between the 4 MUB and umbrella protocols,
their performance against general coherent attacks will
be in this range as well.
After deriving the constraints, we optimized numer-
ically the target function (the protocol rate) with the
CVXOPT convex optimization package[23]. Both pro-
cedures, with and without noise addition, were calcu-
lated. The results are plotted in figure 4. For the 3 MUB
qubit protocol we reproduced the known critical values
of 14.1% (12.7%) (with and without noise optimization).
We find proven lower bounds of 17.7% (16.0%), 20.3%
(18.25%) and 21.1% (19.1%) for the critical error rates
of the 2 (the umbrella), 3 and 4 MUB qutrit protocols,
respectively. The 3 qutrit MUB graph is not presented
here as it can’t be realized within the borders of our sub-
set. These values are considerably higher than the best
value for qubit protocols to date. Just two MUB gives
most of the gain between qubits and qutrits, as previ-
ously suggested by weaker security analysis[11, 12].
We have left open an important issue regarding any
qutrit protocol with biphotons. Namely, what is the re-
lation between the single photon (qubit) error rate of
a certain channel and the qutrit error probability when
transmitting biphotons? This issue will be addressed in
a later work.
In conclusion, we defined the single photon opera-
tion subspace of the polarized biphoton representation
of qutrits. This subspace includes states which are easy
to generate and detect, and thus are easy to implement in
a QKD protocol. We suggested a few possible protocols
within this subspace. The security of these protocols was
analyzed and compared to standard qubit protocols. A
large improvement was shown compared to qubits, even
for the umbrella protocol, which has only two MUB. The
unconditional security of the umbrella and the 4 MUB
protocols was proved by extending a previous proof for
qubits. This is the first time, to the best of our knowl-
edge, that qutrit protocols have received such a rigorous
treatment.
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